

The Men Who Stole the Show

By Tom Barry and Jim Lobe

When he first saw the excerpts leaked to *The New York Times* in spring 1992, Sen. Joseph Biden (D-DE) was horrified and denounced the document as a prescription for “literally a Pax Americana.”¹ The leak, a draft *Defense Policy Guidance* (DPG) on U.S. grand strategy through the 1990s, was stunning in the clarity and ambition of its vision for a new U.S. foreign and military policy. Written in the aftermath of the Gulf War by two relatively obscure political appointees in the Pentagon’s policy department of the Bush Sr. administration, the draft DPG called for U.S. military preeminence over Eurasia by preventing the rise of any potentially hostile power and a policy of preemption against states suspected of developing weapons of mass destruction. It foretold a world in which U.S. military intervention overseas would become “a constant feature” and failed to even mention the United Nations.

Although softened in its final form at the insistence of then National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft and Secretary of State James Baker, the draft DPG occupied a central place in the hearts and minds of its two authors, Paul Wolfowitz and I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby, and their boss, then Pentagon chief Dick Cheney. A decade later, theory was transformed into practice following the devastating terrorist attack on September 11. By then, Dick Cheney had already become the most powerful vice president in U.S. history, and the draft DPG’s two authors, Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz and Cheney’s chief of staff and national security adviser, Lewis Libby, had moved to the center of foreign policymaking in

the Bush administration. They, along with Pentagon chief Donald Rumsfeld, have led a coalition of forces that has successfully engineered what former UN ambassador Richard Holbrooke recently described as a “radical break with 55 years of bipartisan tradition” in U.S. foreign policy.²

That break came as a great shock to most analysts. Candidate George W. Bush’s talk of pursuing a “humble” foreign policy, as well as the narrowness of his electoral victory, suggested that Bush would likely take his cue from his father’s administration. Although the younger Bush’s stress on U.S. “national interests” and his skepticism about nation-building and peace-keeping suggested a likely pullback from the Clinton-Gore team’s more globalist and multilateral aspirations, most pundits saw a likely return to the cautious, balance-of-power realism that characterized his father’s tenure. That assessment seemed even more assured after Bush selected retired General Colin Powell as his secretary of state and Condoleezza Rice as national security adviser. Both were protégés of Brent Scowcroft, in many ways the dean of the realist establishment going back all the way to Gerald Ford for whom he also served as national security adviser. Those assumptions proved dead wrong, however, particularly in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks.

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Security Strategy Foretold

In September 2000, PNAC issued its strategic plan on how America should exercise its global leadership and project its military power. In its forward, PNAC's *Rebuilding America's Defenses* notes that PNAC's plan "builds upon the defense strategy outlined by the Cheney Defense Department in the waning days of the Bush administration." It credits the draft of the *Defense Policy Guidance* as providing "a blueprint for maintaining U.S. preeminence, precluding the rise of a great power rival, and shaping the international security order in line with American principles and interests." (Wolfowitz and Libby were the two dozen consultants involved in the report.) Among the key conclusions of PNAC's defense strategy document were the following:

- "Develop and deploy global missile defenses to defend the American homeland and American allies, and to provide a secure basis for U.S. power projection around the world."
- "Control the new 'international commons' of space and 'cyberspace,' and pave the way for the creation of a new military service—U.S. Space Forces—with the mission of space control."
- "Increase defense spending, adding \$15 billion to \$20 billion to total defense spending annually."
- "Exploit the 'revolution in military affairs' [transformation to high-tech, unmanned weaponry] to insure the long-term superiority of U.S. conventional forces."
- "Need to develop a new family of nuclear weapons designed to address new sets of military requirements" complaining that the U.S. has "virtually ceased development of safer and more effective nuclear weapons."
- "Facing up to the realities of multiple constabulary missions that will require a permanent allocation of U.S. forces."
- "America must defend its homeland" by "reconfiguring its nuclear force" and by missile defense systems that "counteract the effects of the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction."
- "Need for a larger U.S. security perimeter" and the U.S. "should seek to establish a network of 'deployment bases' or 'forward operating bases' to increase the reach of current and future forces," citing the need to move beyond Western Europe and Northeast Asia to increased permanent military presence in Southeast Asia and "other regions of East Asia." Necessary "to cope with the rise of China to great-power status."
- Redirecting the U.S. Air Force to move "toward a global first-strike force."
- End the Clinton administration's "devotion" to the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty.
- "North Korea, Iran, Iraq, or similar states [should not be allowed] to undermine American leadership, intimidate American allies, or threaten the American homeland itself."
- "Main military missions" necessary to "preserve Pax Americana" and a "unipolar 21st century" are the following: "secure and expand zones of democratic peace, deter rise of new great-power competitor, defend key regions (Europe, East Asia, Middle East), and exploit transformation of war."

According to the PNAC report, "The American peace has proven itself peaceful, stable, and durable. Yet no moment in international politics can be frozen in time: even a global Pax Americana will not preserve itself." To preserve this "American peace" through the 21st century, the PNAC report concludes that the global order "must have a secure foundation on unquestioned U.S. military preeminence." The report struck a prescient note when it observed that "the process of transformation is likely to be a long one, absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event—like a new Pearl Harbor." Thomas Donnelly, the document's principal author and recently PNAC's deputy director (until he was recruited by Lockheed-Martin), expressed the hope that "the project's report will be useful as a road map for the nation's immediate and future defense plans." His hope has been realized in the new security strategy and military build-up of the current Bush administration. Many of PNAC's conclusions and recommendations are reflected in the White House's *National Security Strategy* document of September 2002, which reflects the "peace through strength" credo that shapes PNAC strategic thinking.

- Tom Barry

In engineering the radical break in U.S. foreign policy, Wolfowitz, Rumsfeld, and Cheney relied on a handful of think tanks and front groups that have closely interlocking directorates and shared origins in the right-wing and neoconservative organizations of the 1970s. Organizations such as the Project for a New American Century (PNAC), the Center for Security Policy (CSP), and the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) have supplied the administration with a steady stream of policy advice and also with the men—and they are virtually all men—to steer the ship of state on its radical new course. These men are by no means new recruits to the foreign policy elite. They cut their teeth on some of the most fateful foreign policy debates of the last thirty years. Their motto was "peace through strength," and they took great pride in their credentials as militant anticommunists and champions of U.S. military power. Until now, their greatest moments came during Reagan's first term in which most of them held high office. But now, in a world without the Soviet Union, their ambitions are much greater.

As reflected in the draft *DPG*, these forces first saw their opportunity in the "unipolar moment" that followed the Gulf War.³ But they were stymied by the "conservative crack-up" after the Soviet collapse, not to mention the cautious realism of the Bush Sr. administration itself.⁴ As a result, much of the 1990s marked a period of great frustration for these men who had

nothing but contempt for Clinton's fashionable talk of transnational issues such as climate change, HIV/AIDS and other infectious diseases, humanitarian intervention, peacekeeping, conflict prevention, social and environmental standards for the global economy, and the creation of new multilateral mechanisms like the International Criminal Court (ICC). They regarded these transnational challenges and multilateral responses as

nothing less than new constraints on Washington's freedom of action and diversions from the real task of identifying and confronting potential military rivals for its primacy. To them, American foreign policy under Clinton, which they sometimes called "globaloney," was dangerously unfocused.

At the same time, these forces grew alarmed at the strong isolationist streak in many of the Republicans who took control of

Congress after the mid-term elections in 1994. While they applauded the freshmen's contempt for the United Nations and other multilateral agencies, they also fretted about the growing Republican opposition to any form of military engagement abroad, especially in places like the Balkans that they deemed vital to the U.S. national interest. They loved the new Republicans' unilateralism, but deplored their disengagement.

FOCUSING ON THE "NEW AMERICAN CENTURY"

In 1997, an influential group of neoconservatives, social conservatives, and representatives of what Eisenhower referred to as the military-industrial complex came together to form Project for a New American Century (PNAC).⁵ Conservatives had failed to "confidently advance a strategic vision for America's role in the world," the group lamented in its statement of principles. It continued, "We aim to change this. We aim to make the case and rally support for American global leadership." Noting what they called "the essential elements of the Reagan administration's success," namely "a strong military" ready to meet "present and future challenges," they proudly declared: "A Reaganite policy of military strength and moral clarity may not be fash-

ionable today. But it is necessary if the U.S. is to build on the success of this past century and ensure our security and greatness in the next."⁶ Among the twenty-five signers were Wolfowitz, Libby, Rumsfeld, Cheney, Elliott Abrams, Zalmay Khalilzad, and other right-wing luminaries who five years later would use the September 11 outrage to realize their long-held dreams of a new American empire.⁷

Not a think tank like the Heritage Foundation or AEI with the capacity to develop detailed policy recommendations, PNAC has acted as a front group that issues timely statements, often in the form of open letters to the president. Its influence signals the degree to which neoconservatives have charted the main outlines and trajectory of the Bush foreign poli-

cy.⁸ Founded by *Weekly Standard* pundits William Kristol and Robert Kagan, PNAC is the latest incarnation of a series of predominantly neoconservative groups such as the Coalition for a Democratic Majority (CDM) and the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD).⁹ In the 1970s, these groups played key roles in helping to marshal diverse right-wing constituencies around a common foreign and defense policy and organize highly sophisticated public and media campaigns in pursuit of their goals.¹⁰ Their main targets of the time were Jimmy Carter, détente, and arms control agreements with the Soviet Union, but they also used their zest for ideological combat, their political savvy, and propaganda skills to prepare the ground for and later oversee the

more radical policies pursued by the incoming Reagan administration, including Star Wars, the anti-communist crusades in Central America, southern Africa, and Afghanistan, and the creation of a “strategic alliance” with Israel.¹¹ Largely sidelined under the elder Bush and Clinton, these same forces—in many cases, the same individuals—who served under Reagan and then again under the younger Bush spent much of the 1990s trying to reconstitute a new coalition of the kind that dominated Reagan’s first term.

In a 1996 essay in *Foreign Affairs*, “Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy,” PNAC directors Robert Kagan and William Kristol signaled that the right was preparing a new foreign policy agenda that would seize control of the “unipolar moment” and extend it indefinitely into the next century. During the presidential campaign in 2000, Kagan and Kristol edited *Present Dangers: Crisis and Opportunities in American Foreign and Defense Policy*, a PNAC book that included chapters written by many of the leading neoconservative strategists and academics, including Richard Perle, Reuel Marc Gerecht, Peter

Rodman, Elliott Abrams, Fredrick Kagan, William Bennett, and Paul Wolfowitz. This book, with its call for a policy of “regime change” in Iraq, China, North Korea, and Iran, its prescriptions for maintaining “American preeminence,” its recommendations to build global missile defense systems and to distance Washington from arms control treaties, and its pro-Likud position, were presented as a blueprint for a new Republican administration. The extent that the Bush administration has adopted this agenda and integrated its authors into its foreign policy brain trust illustrates the success of PNAC—a

Glossary of the Right-Wing Sectors

Anticommunists: Until the collapse of the Soviet bloc, militant anticommunism served to unify right-wing sectors around a foreign policy that stressed military budget increases, rationalized U.S. support for dictatorial regimes, and supported military intervention. Unlike cold war liberals, who also identified themselves as anticommunists, the militant anticommunists of the right believed that the fight against communism needed to be fought at home as well as abroad, and they advocated aggressive rollback strategies rather than merely containment and deterrence. Militant anticommunism no longer functions as the backbone of the right’s approach to international affairs, although anticommunist convictions still shape the foreign policy agendas of many right-wing ideologues regarding U.S. relations with China, Cuba, and North Korea. This political agenda of crushing all forms of communist governance has created fissures within the right, dividing the proponents of free trade from those who resist establishing normal business relations with countries ruled by Communist parties.

Christian Right: Before the 1970s, the U.S. evangelical movement was a subculture that kept its distance from electoral politics. With a new focus on social conservatism, Republican Party strategists together with neoconservatives and right-wing ideologues encouraged the politicization of the evangelical sectors as part of the New Right fusionism that ushered Ronald Reagan into the presidency in 1981.

Conservative Internationalists: Neoconservatives often use this label to describe themselves. It distinguishes them from the paleoconservatives, from the traditional isolationism of many core Republicans, and from the liberal internationalists found mainly in the Democratic Party.

Conservative Mainstream: Today’s conservative mainstream encompasses all those elements of the right who believe that it is

possible to operate within the electoral arena, including all the groups in this glossary. The mainstream includes think tanks and front groups as well as major constituency organizations like the Christian Coalition. The conservative mainstream may call for radical changes in domestic and foreign policies, but it does not embrace the methods of domestic right-wing vigilante groups, although most sectors of the right have supported U.S. assistance to foreign right-wing vigilante groups. Membership in the conservative mainstream does not equate to resisting social change. Indeed, many conservative groups espouse radical policy agendas. However, conservatives react negatively to changes that are regarded as part of progressive, secular, or liberal policy agendas.

Libertarians: Conservative libertarians have long been part of the conservative mainstream in their embrace of free market solutions and processes and in their opposition to government involvement in social and economic matters. Conservative libertarians share concerns about government infringement on individual civil liberties with progressive civil libertarians. Libertarians also share concerns about U.S. interventionism and foreign aid with paleoconservatives.

National Security Militarists: Closely connected to what President Eisenhower termed the “U.S. military industrial complex,” national security militarists are among the chief proponents of major increases in the U.S. military budget and transformations in military capacity, arguing that the U.S. must maintain military superiority. Closely allied with the most militant anticommunist sectors of the right, the militarists have in recent years rallied around a grand strategy of U.S. global supremacy built on the foundation of unchallenged military power in order to maintain “the American peace” throughout this century.

Neoconservatives: Neoconservatives constitute an intellectual current that emerged from the cold war liberalism of the

group that received no attention during the campaign and despite its continuing influence still remains in the shadows of the public debate about the direction of U.S. foreign policy.

Much as its forebears did twenty-five years ago, PNAC in the late 1990s successfully rallied key right-wing personalities—including men from the Christian Right like Gary Bauer and other social conservatives like William Bennett—behind their imperial vision of U.S. supremacy. This was no small achievement, for the Christian Right was far more interested in

moral and cultural issues than in foreign policy during the 1980s and early 1990s. Moreover, much of that constituency had been attracted to right-wing gadfly Patrick Buchanan who shared its “traditional values” but who also strongly opposed the Gulf War and has long deplored the more imperial, neoconservative influence in the Republican Party. Two other groups, the Center for Security Policy and Empower America played a similar role with respect to forging a new coalition behind the goal of U.S. military and cultural supremacy.

Whatever the validity of U.S. military supremacy theory as a legitimate or effective defense posture, the ideology has immediate rewards for U.S. weapons manufacturers. This nexus of military strategists and the military industry is epitomized by the right-wing Center for Security Policy with its close connections to both military contractors and the Pentagon.¹² The Center’s director Frank Gaffney, one of the original signatories of the PNAC statement in 1997, rejoiced that his group’s “peace through strength” principles have once again found a place in U.S. government. Like the Reagan years, when many

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Democratic Party. Unlike other elements of the conservative mainstream, neoconservatives have historical social roots in liberal and leftist politics. Disillusioned first with socialism and communism and later with new Democrats (like George McGovern) who came to dominate the Democratic Party in the 1970s, neoconservatives played a key role in boosting the New Right into political dominance in the 1980s. For the most part, neoconservatives—who are disproportionately Jewish and Catholic—are not politicians but rather political analysts, activist ideologues, and scholars who have played a central role in forging the agendas of numerous right-wing think tanks, front groups, and foundations. Neoconservatives have a profound belief in America’s moral superiority, which facilitates alliances with the Christian Right and other social conservatives. But unlike either core traditionalists of American conservatism or those with isolationist tendencies, neoconservatives are committed internationalists. As they did in the 1970s, the neoconservatives were instrumental in the late 1990s in helping to fuse diverse elements of the right into a unified force based on a new agenda of U.S. supremacy.

New Right: In the 1970s this manifestation of American conservatism represented a revival of the coalition of libertarians, traditionalists, and anticommunists that gave Barry Goldwater the Republican nomination in 1964. This fusionist movement, however, differed in that it included a politicized evangelical sector (the Christian Right), Democrats disaffected with the liberal platform of the new Democratic Party, and the strong intellectual influence, particularly in foreign policy issues, of the neoconservatives.

Paleoconservatives: In direct contrast to neoconservatives, paleoconservatives reject internationalism and interventionism that is not directly related to protecting U.S. national interests (largely defined as economic interests). Their roots can be traced back to the conservative isolationists and pro fascists of the 1930s and to

the America First movement of the 1940s. After the end of the cold war, the paleoconservatives were one of the few political sectors that criticized the new military interventionism, including both the Gulf War and the humanitarian interventions of the 1990s. On economic issues such as free trade, the paleocons are nationalists and protectionists, while on most domestic issues their posture is one of reactionary populism that includes elements of racism and nativism.

Social Conservatives: This sector, which is mostly focused on domestic issues, arose from the traditionalist backbone of the U.S. conservative movement. Unlike libertarians, social conservatives hold that government has the God-given mandate to enforce a moral order shaped by Christian values. Although not all social conservatives are part of the Christian Right, most support the notion of a “culture war” to protect what they regard to be traditional American values from erosion due to secularism, feminism, and cultural relativism. The international perspective of social conservatives has historically been viewed through the prism of anti-communism, but in the 1990s, neoconservative authors and activists like Samuel Huntington and William Bennett were instrumental in internationalizing the paranoia that fueled the domestic culture wars of the right by positing that Judeo-Christian values and civilization were threatened around the world.

Sources: Amy E. Ansell, ed. *Unraveling the Right: The New Conservatism in American Thought and Politics* (Westview Press, 1998); Chip Berlet and Matthew Lyons, *Right-Wing Populism in America: Too Close for Comfort* (Guilford Press, 2000); Sara Diamond, *Roads to Dominion: Right-Wing Movements and Political Power in the United States* (Guilford Press, 1995). Highly recommended, also, are two glossaries compiled by Political Research Associates that focus on right-wing populism and the Christian Right:
http://www.publiceye.org/research/Chart_of_Sectors.htm and
http://www.publiceye.org/glossary/glossary_big.htm

of the center's current associates directed U.S. military policy, the present administration includes a large number of members of the Center's National Security Advisory Council. An early member of the Center's board, Dick Cheney, is now vice president, and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld was a recipient of the Center's Keeper of the Flame award.

Since the 1970s, neoconservatives had been exploring the global-local links of the "culture war." In the view of the Christian Right, core American values were under attack by a liberal cultural elite that espoused secular humanism and ethical relativism. For neoconservatives, however, the culture war was an international one that threatened the entire Judeo-Christian culture. One of earliest groups taking this position was the Ethics and Public Policy Center, which was established in 1976 "to clarify and reinforce the bond between Judeo-Christian moral tradition and the public policy debate over domestic and foreign policy issues."¹³ The Ethics and Public Policy Center, where Elliott Abrams was an associate in the 1990s before he joined the Bush administration, explored the common moral ground (and common concerns) that Jewish and Catholic conservatives shared with the Christian Right. Long a theme in American politics, the idea of America's cultural supremacy and the need to defend it against mounting international attack had by the late 1990s become a powerful theme in the U.S. political

debate. Neoconservative historian Samuel Huntington provided theoretical cover for this paranoid sense of cultural supremacy in his influential *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*.¹⁴

Former "drug czar" and Education Secretary William J. Bennett, another signatory of the PNAC 1997 statement, has had the most success in making the local-global links in the culture war. Together with Jack Kemp, Bennett in 1999 founded Empower America, a right-wing policy group that argues for domestic and foreign policies informed by conservative moral values. Since September 11, Bennett's Empower America, together with subsidiary groups, has propagated the Bush administration's own message of a moral and military crusade against evil.¹⁵ As part of its campaign to highlight the moral character of Bush's foreign policy, Empower America formed a new group called Americans for Victory Over Terrorism (AVOT). In a full-page ad in *The New York Times*, AVOT chairman Bennett warned: "The threats we face are both external and internal." Within the United States are "those who are attempting to use this opportunity [9/11] to promulgate their agenda of 'blame America first'." In its pronouncement, AVOT identified U.S. public opinion as the key battleground in the war against America's external and internal threats. "Our goal," declared AVOT, "is to address the present threats so as to eradicate future ter-

rorism and defeat ideologies that support it."¹⁶ Also in the forefront of focusing attention on internal threats has been Lynne Cheney, wife of the vice president and an associate at the American Enterprise Institute, who played a lead role in founding the American Council of Trustees and Alumni (ACTA) that singled out professors deemed not sufficiently patriotic.

Under the tutelage of neoconservatives like Elliott Abrams and under the guiding hand of William Bennett, social conservatives, particularly those associated with the Christian Right, have become new internationalists.¹⁷ Looking beyond the culture wars at home, they found new reasons for a rightist internationalism abroad. Building on the Biblical foundations for an apocalyptic showdown in the Middle East, the Christian Right has fully supported the neoconservative agenda on U.S.-Israel relations.¹⁸ In their literature and Internet presence, socially conservative groups like Empower America and the Foundation for the Defense of Democracy place special emphasis on the righteousness of the campaign against the Palestinians by the Likud Party of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon.¹⁹ Other galvanizing issues for social conservatives are the persecution of Christians abroad, especially in Islamic countries and China, sex trafficking, and "yellow peril" threat of communist China.



BRINGING IT ALL TOGETHER

As during the Reagan administration, the right-wing think tanks have played a key role in shaping the new policy framework. Especially important has been the neoconservative American Enterprise Institute whose most prominent member of the Bush administration is Richard Perle, the chair of Rumsfeld's Defense Planning Board.²⁰ Perle, a supporter of PNAC, helped establish The Center for Security Policy and the increasingly influential Jewish Institute for National Security (JINSA).²¹ Over the years, AEI has been in the forefront of calling for preemptive military attacks against rogue states and has denounced as "appeasement" all efforts by Washington and its European allies to "engage" North Korea, Iran, or Iraq. The Bush administration has embraced virtually all of the policy positions that the AEI has promoted on the Middle East. Coursing through AEI policy analysis—and now through the Bush administration—is a profound belief in the inherent goodness and redemptive mission of the United States, criticism of the moral cowardice of "liberals" and "European elites," an imperative to support Israel against the "implacable hatred" of Muslims, and a conviction in the primacy of military power in an essentially Hobbesian world. Although not yet part of the official rhetoric, AEI's

belief that a conflict with China is inevitable is also one held by the hawks in the administration.

On the editorial pages of the *Weekly Standard* (published by PNAC cofounder William Kristol), *The Wall Street Journal*, *National Review*, *Commentary Magazine*, and *The Washington Times*, as well as in the nationally syndicated columns by William Safire, Michael Kelly, and Charles Krauthammer, the State Department (particularly its Near East bureau) came under steady attack.²² But even within the State Department, the new foreign policy radicals had set up camp. Over Powell's objections, Bush appointed John Bolton, an ultra-unilateralist ideologue and former vice president of the American Enterprise Institute, as undersecretary of state for arms control and international security.

For the most part, the political right led by the neoconservatives has focused on the need for America to assert its military and diplomatic power—a focus underscored by the war on terrorism. In marked contrast to the Clinton years, the neoconservative strategists together with the hawks have sidelined the public debate about globalization. Instead of fretting over social and environmental standards in the global economy, the

economic focus is on securing U.S. national interests, particularly energy resources, and thereby ensuring continued U.S. economic supremacy. A continued weakening of the U.S. economy and a rising concern of U.S. military over-reach is contributing to some fracturing of the right.²³

This small group of right-wing strategists, ideologues, and operatives in right-wing think tanks, advocacy groups, and the news media has captured U.S. foreign and military policy. At issue is not so much that this shift in foreign policy has been engineered by a narrow elite—given that foreign policy has traditionally been the province of conservative and liberal elites—but rather the implications of this sharp turn to the right. Clearly, a new foreign policy vision was needed to match the new global realities. But is this show of American supremacy the grand strategy that best serves U.S. national interests and security? In the end, the U.S. electorate will need to decide if they want this show of supremacy and power to go on. As Americans we will need to decide if we now feel more secure, if our economic and moral interests are better represented now, and if a foreign policy based on extending U.S. supremacy makes us proud to be Americans.



ENDNOTES

- ¹ Barton Gellman, "Keeping the U.S. First; Pentagon Would Preclude a Rival Superpower," *The Washington Post*, 11 March 1992, p. 1.
- ² Todd S. Purdum, "Embattled, Scrutinized, Powell Soldiers On," *The New York Times*, July 25, 2002.
- ³ Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 70, no. 1 (Winter 1990-91).
- ⁴ Key parts of the right-wing anti-communist coalition—particularly the libertarians and "paleoconservatives" such as Pat Buchanan—strongly opposed the imperial vision of the kind that Krauthammer and fellow-neoconservatives were proposing.
- ⁵ Tom Barry and Jim Lobe, "Foreign Policy: Right Face, Forward March," *Foreign Policy In Focus*, April 2002 <<http://www.fpiif.org/papers/02right/index.html>>.
- ⁶ Statement of Principles, Project for the New American Century, June 3, 1997, <<http://www.newamericancentury.org/statementofprinciples.htm>>.
- ⁷ PNAC boosters have not shied away from the notion of an imperium. See, for example, Dan Balz, "In War Reversal, Criticism is Mostly From Right," *The Washington Post*, Nov. 26, 2001, quoting William Kristol.
- ⁸ In addition to Robert Kagan and William Kristol, other neoconservatives that have associated themselves with PNAC include Elliott Abrams, Eliot Cohen, Midge Decter, Francis Fukuyama, Jeane Kirkpatrick, Norman Podhoretz, and George Weigel. Prominent social conservatives associated with PNAC include Gary Bauer, William Bennett, Steve Forbes, Dan Quayle, and Vin Weber. Hawks or national security militarists include Richard Cheney, Frank Gafney, Zalmay Khalilzad, I. Lewis Libby, Richard Perle, Peter Rodman, Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, and R. James Woolsey.
- ⁹ Sara Diamond, *Roads to Dominion: Right-Wing Movements and Political Power in the United States* (New York: Guilford Press, 1996), pp. 178-202.
- ¹⁰ See Diamond, *Roads to Dominion*, for excellent treatment of fusionist trends in the right until the mid-1990s. According to Diamond, the New Right of the 1970s and 1980s "represented a reassertion of the old fusionist blend of anticommunism, traditionalism, and libertarianism" but with more emphasis on moral traditionalism than given by the fusionists of the 1950s.
- ¹¹ Daniel Patrick Moynihan, *Pandaemonium: Ethnicity in International Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 36: "They wished for a military posture approaching mobilization; they would create or invent whatever crises were required to bring this about."
- ¹² For the influence of the Center for National Security and arms manufacturers, see William Hartung, *Military Industrial Complex Revisited, Foreign Policy In Focus Special Report*, June 1999, <<http://www.fpiif.org/papers/micr/index.html>>. See also Jason Vest, "The Men from JINSA and CSP" *The Nation*, September 2/9, 2002.
- ¹³ Ethics and Public Policy Center, "About EPPC," <<http://www.eppc.org/about/xq/ASP/qx/about.htm>>.
- ¹⁴ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996).
- ¹⁵ Also see William Bennett, *Why We Fight: Moral Clarity and the War on Terrorism* (New York: Doubleday, 2002).
- ¹⁶ *The New York Times*, March 10, 2002.
- ¹⁷ Nicholas Kristof, "The New Internationalists," *New York Times*, May 21, 2002.
- ¹⁸ For a helpful examination of the links between the Christian Right and the largely Jewish neoconservatives, see Chip Berlet and Matthew N. Lyons, *Right-Wing Populism in America: Too Close for Comfort* (New York: Guilford Press, 2000). The founders of neoconservative thought, Irving Kristol, Midge Decter, and Gertrude Himmelfarb, defend the Christian Right, declaring that on "the survival of Israel, the Jews have no more stalwart friends than evangelical Christians," if for no other reason than the millennialist and dispensationalist beliefs of the Christian Right revolve around an apocalyptic showdown in Jerusalem (Berlet and Lyons, p. 263). Also see Sara Diamond, *Roads to Dominion*, op. cit.
- ¹⁹ The three principals of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, founded in the wake of 9/11, are Jack Kemp, Jeane Kirkpatrick, and Steve Forbes.
- ²⁰ For more on the connections between AEI and the Bush administration, see Jim Lobe, "The Axis of Incitement," Inter Press Service, March 6, 2002.
- ²¹ Working with Perle at AEI, in addition to Lynne Cheney, are several other neoconservatives who have played important roles in expanding the list of potential targets for the administration's war on terrorism, including Michael Ledeen, who cofounded JINSA with Gaffney; former CIA officer Reuel Marc Gerecht, who also heads PNAC's Mideast project; and Michael Rubin, who was hired by the Pentagon to help prepare the groundwork for a post-Hussein Iraq. Ledeen, who gained notoriety as an intermediary between Oliver North and the Iranians in the Iran-Contra affairs, and Gerecht have both been especially outspoken about promoting a pro-U.S. uprising in Iran.
- ²² Jim Lobe & Tom Barry, "U.S. Middle East Policy: 'Enough is Enough,'" *Foreign Policy In Focus*, April 2002, <<http://www.fpiif.org/commentary/2002/0204pnac.html>>.
- ²³ This pragmatic application of free trade philosophy to U.S. foreign economic policy is the prevailing approach of conservatives (and most liberal policymakers, as well) in pursuing economic supremacy. However, within this general framework, there are bitter divisions. The nationalist and reactionary populist right wing, as epitomized by Pat Buchanan, contends that Washington increasingly measures U.S. economic interests by what is good for foot-loose U.S. corporations rather than the American people and domestic production. The populist Right is more apt to support protectionist measures than the dominant internationalists of the Republican Party, who respond primarily to the interests of corporate donors. A similar split within the right regarding international economic policy revolves around U.S. sanctions. Unilateral economic sanctions are generally opposed by the right's Wall Street donors but are heartily supported by right-wing populists and neoconservatives. A powerful coalition of business interests complains that the imposition of economic sanctions in response to violations of human rights and other international norms has the effect of handicapping U.S. corporations and undermining the drive for U.S. economic supremacy. This business-first approach infuriates the moral, political, and military ideologues of the right, who believe that the U.S. should severely restrict or condition its business dealings with respect to such considerations as national security, anti-communism, and the repression of religious minorities, principally Christians. For more on the divisions within the Right on economic supremacy concerns, see Tom Barry and Jim Lobe, "U.S. Foreign Policy—Attention, Right Face, Forward March," op. cit.

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